# -*- text -*-
##
## eap.conf -- Configuration for EAP types (PEAP, TTLS, etc.)
##
## $Id: a89a783663588017b12bcc076362e728261ba8f2 $
#######################################################################
#
# Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'. The server
# is smart enough to figure this out on its own. The most
# common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the
# users then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
#
eap {
# Invoke the default supported EAP type when
# EAP-Identity response is received.
#
# The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP
# type they will be using, so it MUST be set here.
#
# For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
#
# If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module,
# then that EAP type takes precedence over the
# default type configured here.
#
default_eap_type = ttls
# A list is maintained to correlate EAP-Response
# packets with EAP-Request packets. After a
# configurable length of time, entries in the list
# expire, and are deleted.
#
timer_expire = 60
# There are many EAP types, but the server has support
# for only a limited subset. If the server receives
# a request for an EAP type it does not support, then
# it normally rejects the request. By setting this
# configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to
# instead keep processing the request. Another module
# MUST then be configured to proxy the request to
# another RADIUS server which supports that EAP type.
#
# If another module is NOT configured to handle the
# request, then the request will still end up being
# rejected.
#
ignore_unknown_eap_types = no
# Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug. When given
# a User-Name attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one
# more byte than it should.
#
# We can work around it by configurably adding an extra
# zero byte.
#
cisco_accounting_username_bug = no
# Help prevent DoS attacks by limiting the number of
# sessions that the server is tracking. For simplicity,
# this is taken from the "max_requests" directive in
# radiusd.conf.
#
max_sessions = ${max_requests}
############################################################
#
# Supported EAP-types
#
# EAP-MD5
#
# We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication
# for wireless connections. It is insecure, and does
# not provide for dynamic WEP keys.
#
#md5 {
#}
# EAP-pwd -- secure password-based authentication
#
#pwd {
# group = 19
# server_id = theserver@example.com
# This has the same meaning as for TLS.
#
# fragment_size = 1020
# The virtual server which determines the
# "known good" password for the user.
# Note that unlike TLS, only the "authorize"
# section is processed. EAP-PWD requests can be
# distinguished by having a User-Name, but
# no User-Password, CHAP-Password, EAP-Message, etc.
#
# virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
#}
# Cisco LEAP
#
# We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments. See:
# http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
#
# Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not
# the MS-CHAP attributes) to perform it's authentication.
#
# As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text
# User-Password, or the NT-Password attributes.
# 'System' authentication is impossible with LEAP.
#
#leap {
#}
# EAP-GTC -- Generic Token Card
#
# Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS,
# or EAP-PEAP. The module "challenges" the user with
# text, and the response from the user is taken to be
# the User-Password.
#
# Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea,
# the users password will go over the wire in plain-text,
# for anyone to see.
#
#gtc {
# The default challenge, which many clients
# ignore..
#
# challenge = "Password: "
# The plain-text response which comes back
# is put into a User-Password attribute,
# and passed to another module for
# authentication. This allows the EAP-GTC
# response to be checked against plain-text,
# or crypt'd passwords.
#
# If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then
# the module will look for a User-Password
# configured for the request, and do the
# authentication itself.
#
# auth_type = PAP
#}
# Common TLS configuration for TLS-based EAP types
# ------------------------------------------------
#
# See raddb/certs/README for additional comments
# on certificates.
#
# If OpenSSL was not found at the time the server was
# built, the "tls", "ttls", and "peap" sections will
# be ignored.
#
# If you do not currently have certificates signed by
# a trusted CA you may use the 'snakeoil' certificates.
# Included with the server in raddb/certs.
#
# If these certificates have not been auto-generated:
# cd raddb/certs
# make
#
# These test certificates SHOULD NOT be used in a normal
# deployment. They are created only to make it easier
# to install the server, and to perform some simple
# tests with EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP.
#
# Note that you should NOT use a globally known CA here!
# e.g. using a Verisign cert as a "known CA" means that
# ANYONE who has a certificate signed by them can
# authenticate via EAP-TLS! This is likely not what you want.
#
tls-config tls-common {
private_key_password = whatever
private_key_file = ${certdir}/server.pem
# If Private key & Certificate are located in
# the same file, then private_key_file &
# certificate_file must contain the same file
# name.
#
# If ca_file (below) is not used, then the
# certificate_file below SHOULD also include all of
# the intermediate CA certificates used to sign the
# server certificate, but NOT the root CA.
#
# Including the ROOT CA certificate is not useful and
# merely inflates the exchanged data volume during
# the TLS negotiation.
#
# This file should contain the server certificate,
# followed by intermediate certificates, in order.
# i.e. If we have a server certificate signed by CA1,
# which is signed by CA2, which is signed by a root
# CA, then the "certificate_file" should contain
# server.pem, followed by CA1.pem, followed by
# CA2.pem.
#
# When using "ca_file" or "ca_dir", the
# "certificate_file" should contain only
# "server.pem". And then you may (or may not) need
# to set "auto_chain", depending on your version of
# OpenSSL.
#
# In short, SSL / TLS certificates are complex.
# There are many versions of software, each of which
# behave slightly differently. It is impossible to
# give advice which will work everywhere. Instead,
# we give general guidelines.
#
certificate_file = ${certdir}/server.pem
# Trusted Root CA list
#
# This file can contain multiple CA certificates.
# ALL of the CA's in this list will be trusted to
# issue client certificates for authentication.
#
# In general, you should use self-signed
# certificates for 802.1x (EAP) authentication.
# In that case, this CA file should contain
# *one* CA certificate.
#
ca_file = ${cadir}/ca.pem
# OpenSSL will automatically create certificate chains,
# unless we tell it to not do that. The problem is that
# it sometimes gets the chains right from a certificate
# signature view, but wrong from the clients view.
#
# When setting "auto_chain = no", the server certificate
# file MUST include the full certificate chain.
#
# auto_chain = yes
# If OpenSSL supports TLS-PSK, then we can use a
# fixed PSK identity and (hex) password. As of
# 3.0.18, these can be used at the same time as the
# certificate configuration, but only for TLS 1.0
# through 1.2.
#
# If PSK and certificates are configured at the same
# time for TLS 1.3, then the server will warn you,
# and will disable TLS 1.3, as it will not work.
#
# The work around is to have two modules (or for
# RadSec, two listen sections). One will have PSK
# configured, and the other will have certificates
# configured.
#
# psk_identity = "test"
# psk_hexphrase = "036363823"
# Dynamic queries for the PSK. If TLS-PSK is used,
# and psk_query is set, then you MUST NOT use
# psk_identity or psk_hexphrase.
#
# Instead, use a dynamic expansion similar to the one
# below. It keys off of TLS-PSK-Identity. It should
# return a of string no more than 512 hex characters.
# That string will be converted to binary, and will
# be used as the dynamic PSK hexphrase.
#
# Note that this query is just an example. You will
# need to customize it for your installation.
#
# psk_query = "%{sql:select hex(key) from psk_keys where keyid = '%{TLS-PSK-Identity}'}"
# For DH cipher suites to work, you have to
# run OpenSSL to create the DH file first:
#
# openssl dhparam -out certs/dh 2048
#
dh_file = ${certdir}/dh
# If your system doesn't have /dev/urandom,
# you will need to create this file, and
# periodically change its contents.
#
# For security reasons, FreeRADIUS doesn't
# write to files in its configuration
# directory.
#
# random_file = /dev/urandom
# This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS
# packet (4096 bytes), and is preferably half
# that, to accommodate other attributes in
# RADIUS packet. On most APs the MAX packet
# length is configured between 1500 - 1600
# In these cases, fragment size should be
# 1024 or less.
#
# fragment_size = 1024
# include_length is a flag which is
# by default set to yes If set to
# yes, Total Length of the message is
# included in EVERY packet we send.
# If set to no, Total Length of the
# message is included ONLY in the
# First packet of a fragment series.
#
# include_length = yes
# Check the Certificate Revocation List
#
# 1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
# 2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'.
# 'c_rehash' is OpenSSL's command.
# 3) uncomment the lines below.
# 5) Restart radiusd
# check_crl = yes
# Check if intermediate CAs have been revoked.
# check_all_crl = yes
ca_path = ${cadir}
# Accept an expired Certificate Revocation List
#
# allow_expired_crl = no
# If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will
# be checked against the DN of the issuer in
# the client certificate. If the values do not
# match, the certificate verification will fail,
# rejecting the user.
#
# This check can be done more generally by checking
# the value of the TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer attribute.
# This check can be done via any mechanism you
# choose.
#
# check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd"
# If check_cert_cn is set, the value will
# be xlat'ed and checked against the CN
# in the client certificate. If the values
# do not match, the certificate verification
# will fail rejecting the user.
#
# This check is done only if the previous
# "check_cert_issuer" is not set, or if
# the check succeeds.
#
# In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done
# more generally by checking the value of the
# TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name attribute. This check
# can be done via any mechanism you choose.
#
# check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}
# Set this option to specify the allowed
# TLS cipher suites. The format is listed
# in "man 1 ciphers".
#
# For EAP-FAST, use "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
#
cipher_list = "PROFILE=SYSTEM"
# If enabled, OpenSSL will use server cipher list
# (possibly defined by cipher_list option above)
# for choosing right cipher suite rather than
# using client-specified list which is OpenSSl default
# behavior. Setting this to "yes" means that OpenSSL
# will choose the servers ciphers, even if they do not
# best match what the client sends.
#
# TLS negotiation is usually good, but can be imperfect.
# This setting allows administrators to "fine tune" it
# if necessary.
#
cipher_server_preference = no
# You can selectively disable TLS versions for
# compatability with old client devices.
#
# If your system has OpenSSL 1.1.0 or greater, do NOT
# use these. Instead, set tls_min_version and
# tls_max_version.
#
# disable_tlsv1_2 = no
disable_tlsv1_1 = yes
disable_tlsv1 = yes
# Set min / max TLS version. Mainly for Debian
# "trusty", which disables older versions of TLS, and
# requires the application to manually enable them.
#
# If you are running Debian trusty, you should set
# these options, otherwise older clients will not be
# able to connect.
#
# Allowed values are "1.0", "1.1", "1.2", and "1.3".
#
# Note that the server WILL NOT permit negotiation of
# TLS 1.3. The EAP-TLS standards for TLS 1.3 are NOT
# finished. It is therefore impossible for the server
# to negotiate EAP-TLS correctly with TLS 1.3.
#
# The values must be in quotes.
#
tls_min_version = "1.2"
tls_max_version = "1.2"
# Elliptical cryptography configuration
#
# Only for OpenSSL >= 0.9.8.f
#
ecdh_curve = "prime256v1"
# Session resumption / fast reauthentication
# cache.
#
# The cache contains the following information:
#
# session Id - unique identifier, managed by SSL
# User-Name - from the Access-Accept
# Stripped-User-Name - from the Access-Request
# Cached-Session-Policy - from the Access-Accept
#
# See also the "store" subsection below for
# additional attributes which can be cached.
#
# The "Cached-Session-Policy" is the name of a
# policy which should be applied to the cached
# session. This policy can be used to assign
# VLANs, IP addresses, etc. It serves as a useful
# way to re-apply the policy from the original
# Access-Accept to the subsequent Access-Accept
# for the cached session.
#
# On session resumption, these attributes are
# copied from the cache, and placed into the
# reply list.
#
# You probably also want "use_tunneled_reply = yes"
# when using fast session resumption.
#
# You can check if a session has been resumed by
# looking for the existence of the EAP-Session-Resumed
# attribute. Note that this attribute will *only*
# exist in the "post-auth" section.
#
# CAVEATS: The cache is stored and reloaded BEFORE
# the "post-auth" section is run. This limitation
# makes caching more difficult than it should be. In
# practice, it means that the first authentication
# session must set the reply attributes before the
# post-auth section is run.
#
# When the session is resumed, the attributes are
# restored and placed into the session-state list.
#
cache {
# Enable it. The default is "no". Deleting the entire "cache"
# subsection also disables caching.
#
# As of version 3.0.14, the session cache requires the use
# of the "name" and "persist_dir" configuration items, below.
#
# The internal OpenSSL session cache has been permanently
# disabled.
#
# You can disallow resumption for a particular user by adding the
# following attribute to the control item list:
#
# Allow-Session-Resumption = No
#
# If "enable = no" below, you CANNOT enable resumption for just one
# user by setting the above attribute to "yes".
#
enable = no
# Lifetime of the cached entries, in hours. The sessions will be
# deleted/invalidated after this time.
#
lifetime = 24 # hours
# Internal "name" of the session cache. Used to
# distinguish which TLS context sessions belong to.
#
# The server will generate a random value if unset.
# This will change across server restart so you MUST
# set the "name" if you want to persist sessions (see
# below).
#
# name = "EAP module"
# Simple directory-based storage of sessions.
# Two files per session will be written, the SSL
# state and the cached VPs. This will persist session
# across server restarts.
#
# The default directory is ${logdir}, for historical
# reasons. You should ${db_dir} instead. And check
# the value of db_dir in the main radiusd.conf file.
# It should not point to ${raddb}
#
# The server will need write perms, and the directory
# should be secured from anyone else. You might want
# a script to remove old files from here periodically:
#
# find ${logdir}/tlscache -mtime +2 -exec rm -f {} \;
#
# This feature REQUIRES "name" option be set above.
#
# persist_dir = "${logdir}/tlscache"
#
# As of 3.0.20, it is possible to partially
# control which attributes exist in the
# session cache. This subsection lists
# attributes which are taken from the reply,
# and saved to the on-disk cache. When the
# session is resumed, these attributes are
# added to the "session-state" list. The
# default configuration will then take care
# of copying them to the reply.
#
store {
Tunnel-Private-Group-Id
}
}
# As of version 2.1.10, client certificates can be
# validated via an external command. This allows
# dynamic CRLs or OCSP to be used.
#
# This configuration is commented out in the
# default configuration. Uncomment it, and configure
# the correct paths below to enable it.
#
# If OCSP checking is enabled, and the OCSP checks fail,
# the verify section is not run.
#
# If OCSP checking is disabled, the verify section is
# run on successful certificate validation.
#
verify {
# If the OCSP checks succeed, the verify section
# is run to allow additional checks.
#
# If you want to skip verify on OCSP success,
# uncomment this configuration item, and set it
# to "yes".
#
# skip_if_ocsp_ok = no
# A temporary directory where the client
# certificates are stored. This directory
# MUST be owned by the UID of the server,
# and MUST not be accessible by any other
# users. When the server starts, it will do
# "chmod go-rwx" on the directory, for
# security reasons. The directory MUST
# exist when the server starts.
#
# You should also delete all of the files
# in the directory when the server starts.
#
# tmpdir = /var/run/radiusd/tmp
# The command used to verify the client cert.
# We recommend using the OpenSSL command-line
# tool.
#
# The ${..ca_path} text is a reference to
# the ca_path variable defined above.
#
# The %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename} is the name
# of the temporary file containing the cert
# in PEM format. This file is automatically
# deleted by the server when the command
# returns.
#
# client = "/usr/bin/openssl verify -CApath ${..ca_path} %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename}"
}
# OCSP Configuration
#
# Certificates can be verified against an OCSP
# Responder. This makes it possible to immediately
# revoke certificates without the distribution of
# new Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
#
ocsp {
# Enable it. The default is "no".
# Deleting the entire "ocsp" subsection
# also disables ocsp checking
#
enable = no
# The OCSP Responder URL can be automatically
# extracted from the certificate in question.
# To override the OCSP Responder URL set
# "override_cert_url = yes".
#
override_cert_url = yes
# If the OCSP Responder address is not extracted from
# the certificate, the URL can be defined here.
#
url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"
# If the OCSP Responder can not cope with nonce
# in the request, then it can be disabled here.
#
# For security reasons, disabling this option
# is not recommended as nonce protects against
# replay attacks.
#
# Note that Microsoft AD Certificate Services OCSP
# Responder does not enable nonce by default. It is
# more secure to enable nonce on the responder than
# to disable it in the query here.
# See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770413%28WS.10%29.aspx
#
# use_nonce = yes
# Number of seconds before giving up waiting
# for OCSP response. 0 uses system default.
#
# timeout = 0
# Normally an error in querying the OCSP
# responder (no response from server, server did
# not understand the request, etc) will result in
# a validation failure.
#
# To treat these errors as 'soft' failures and
# still accept the certificate, enable this
# option.
#
# Warning: this may enable clients with revoked
# certificates to connect if the OCSP responder
# is not available. Use with caution.
#
# softfail = no
}
}
# EAP-TLS
#
# As of Version 3.0, the TLS configuration for TLS-based
# EAP types is above in the "tls-config" section.
#
#tls {
# Point to the common TLS configuration
#
# tls = tls-common
# As part of checking a client certificate, the EAP-TLS
# sets some attributes such as TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name. This
# virtual server has access to these attributes, and can
# be used to accept or reject the request.
#
# virtual_server = check-eap-tls
#}
# EAP-TTLS -- Tunneled TLS
#
# The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol,
# which can be described as EAP inside of Diameter,
# inside of TLS, inside of EAP, inside of RADIUS...
#
# Surprisingly, it works quite well.
#
ttls {
# Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
# are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
#
# In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
# v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
# section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
# above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
# tls above) MUST be commented out.
#
tls = tls-common
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
# which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
# EAP module. Inside of the TTLS tunnel, we recommend
# using EAP-MD5. If the request does not contain an
# EAP conversation, then this configuration entry is
# ignored.
#
default_eap_type = pap
# The tunneled authentication request does not usually
# contain useful attributes like 'Calling-Station-Id',
# etc. These attributes are outside of the tunnel,
# and normally unavailable to the tunneled
# authentication request.
#
# By setting this configuration entry to 'yes',
# any attribute which is NOT in the tunneled
# authentication request, but which IS available
# outside of the tunnel, is copied to the tunneled
# request.
#
# allowed values: {no, yes}
#
copy_request_to_tunnel = no
# As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
# is deprecated. Instead, you should use
#
# update outer.session-state {
# ...
# }
#
# This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
#
# The reply attributes sent to the NAS are usually
# based on the name of the user 'outside' of the
# tunnel (usually 'anonymous'). If you want to send
# the reply attributes based on the user name inside
# of the tunnel, then set this configuration entry to
# 'yes', and the reply to the NAS will be taken from
# the reply to the tunneled request.
#
# allowed values: {no, yes}
#
use_tunneled_reply = no
# The inner tunneled request can be sent
# through a virtual server constructed
# specifically for this purpose.
#
# A virtual server MUST be specified.
#
virtual_server = "labitat-inner"
# This has the same meaning, and overwrites, the
# same field in the "tls" configuration, above.
# The default value here is "yes".
#
# include_length = yes
# Unlike EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS does not require a client
# certificate. However, you can require one by setting the
# following option. You can also override this option by
# setting
#
# EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
#
# in the control items for a request.
#
# Note that the majority of supplicants do not support using a
# client certificate with EAP-TTLS, so this option is unlikely
# to be usable for most people.
#
# require_client_cert = yes
}
# EAP-PEAP
#
##################################################
#
# !!!!! WARNINGS for Windows compatibility !!!!!
#
##################################################
#
# If you see the server send an Access-Challenge,
# and the client never sends another Access-Request,
# then
#
# STOP!
#
# The server certificate has to have special OID's
# in it, or else the Microsoft clients will silently
# fail. See the "scripts/xpextensions" file for
# details, and the following page:
#
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/814394/
#
# If is still doesn't work, and you're using Samba,
# you may be encountering a Samba bug. See:
#
# https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6563
#
# Note that we do not necessarily agree with their
# explanation... but the fix does appear to work.
#
##################################################
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type
# which is separate from the one for the non-tunneled
# EAP module. Inside of the TLS/PEAP tunnel, we
# recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
#
#peap {
# Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
# are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
#
# In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
# v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
# section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
# above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
# tls above) MUST be commented out.
#
# tls = tls-common
# The tunneled EAP session needs a default
# EAP type which is separate from the one for
# the non-tunneled EAP module. Inside of the
# PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2,
# as that is the default type supported by
# Windows clients.
#
# default_eap_type = mschapv2
# The PEAP module also has these configuration
# items, which are the same as for TTLS.
#
# copy_request_to_tunnel = no
# As of version 3.0.5, this configuration item
# is deprecated. Instead, you should use
#
# update outer.session-state {
# ...
# }
#
# This will cache attributes for the final Access-Accept.
#
# use_tunneled_reply = no
# When the tunneled session is proxied, the
# home server may not understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2.
# Set this entry to "no" to proxy the tunneled
# EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
#
# proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes
# The inner tunneled request can be sent
# through a virtual server constructed
# specifically for this purpose.
#
# A virtual server MUST be specified.
#
# virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
# This option enables support for MS-SoH
# see doc/SoH.txt for more info.
# It is disabled by default.
#
# soh = yes
# The SoH reply will be turned into a request which
# can be sent to a specific virtual server:
#
# soh_virtual_server = "soh-server"
# Unlike EAP-TLS, PEAP does not require a client certificate.
# However, you can require one by setting the following
# option. You can also override this option by setting
#
# EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
#
# in the control items for a request.
#
# Note that the majority of supplicants do not support using a
# client certificate with PEAP, so this option is unlikely to
# be usable for most people.
#
# require_client_cert = yes
#}
# EAP-MSCHAPv2
#
# Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not
# the main 'mschap' module.
#
# Note also that in order for this sub-module to work,
# the main 'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
#
# This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2
# in EAP. There is another (incompatible) implementation
# of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not
# currently support.
#
#mschapv2 {
# Prior to version 2.1.11, the module never
# sent the MS-CHAP-Error message to the
# client. This worked, but it had issues
# when the cached password was wrong. The
# server *should* send "E=691 R=0" to the
# client, which tells it to prompt the user
# for a new password.
#
# The default is to behave as in 2.1.10 and
# earlier, which is known to work. If you
# set "send_error = yes", then the error
# message will be sent back to the client.
# This *may* help some clients work better,
# but *may* also cause other clients to stop
# working.
#
# send_error = no
# Server identifier to send back in the challenge.
# This should generally be the host name of the
# RADIUS server. Or, some information to uniquely
# identify it.
#
# identity = "FreeRADIUS"
#}
# EAP-FAST
#
# The FAST module implements the EAP-FAST protocol
#
#fast {
# Point to the common TLS configuration
#
# tls = tls-common
# If 'cipher_list' is set here, it will over-ride the
# 'cipher_list' configuration from the 'tls-common'
# configuration. The EAP-FAST module has it's own
# over-ride for 'cipher_list' because the
# specifications mandata a different set of ciphers
# than are used by the other EAP methods.
#
# cipher_list though must include "ADH" for anonymous provisioning.
# This is not as straight forward as appending "ADH" alongside
# "DEFAULT" as "DEFAULT" contains "!aNULL" so instead it is
# recommended "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2" is used
#
# Note - for OpenSSL 1.1.0 and above you may need
# to add ":@SECLEVEL=0"
#
# cipher_list = "PROFILE=SYSTEM"
# PAC lifetime in seconds (default: seven days)
#
# pac_lifetime = 604800
# Authority ID of the server
#
# If you are running a cluster of RADIUS servers, you should make
# the value chosen here (and for "pac_opaque_key") the same on all
# your RADIUS servers. This value should be unique to your
# installation. We suggest using a domain name.
#
# authority_identity = "1234"
# PAC Opaque encryption key (must be exactly 32 bytes in size)
#
# This value MUST be secret, and MUST be generated using
# a secure method, such as via 'openssl rand -hex 32'
#
# pac_opaque_key = "0123456789abcdef0123456789ABCDEF"
# Same as for TTLS, PEAP, etc.
#
# virtual_server = inner-tunnel
#}
}
